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African Affairs 100:27-54 (2001)
© 2001 The Royal African Society

Article

Corporate and state responses to anti-oil protests in the Niger Delta

Jedrzej George Frynas

International Business at Coventry Business School, Coventry University, UK

Conflicts between oil companies and village communities in the Niger Delta have lasted for several decades, but during the 1990s they escalated further and received international media coverage. Much of it focused on the anti-Shell protests by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) which led to Shell's withdrawal from the Ogoni area in 1993. Notwithstanding the political changes following General Abacha's death in June 1998, the conflicts are continuing. While the intensity of the Ogoni protests decreased from 1995 onwards, other ethnic and political groups across the Niger Delta began to disrupt oil activities. This article critically examines the response of the Nigerian state and the oil companies to the anti-oil protests in the Delta. The investigation focuses on three generic strategies: concessions by the state and oil companies to protesters, such as the creation of development projects; the use of public relations in dealing with the Niger Delta crisis; and the use of violence by the state and the oil companies against anti-oil protesters. The analysis suggests that the state and corporate response to the Niger Delta crisis has so far been inadequate in the sense that it fails to satisfy the demands of the local people. Judging from past experience, unless there are structural changes within Nigeria's institutional framework, which would allow for a more effective use of the country's oil wealth for the benefit of the oil-producing areas, conflicts in the Niger Delta are likely to continue.


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