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African Affairs 2005 104(416):375-398; doi:10.1093/afraf/adi034
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© The Author [2005]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved

Article

The hidden costs of power-sharing: Reproducing insurgent violence in Africa

Denis M. Tull

(denis.tull@swp-berlin.org) is a research associate at the German Institute for International Affairs and Security in Berlin

Andreas Mehler

Director of the Institute of African Affairs is Hamburg

Abstract

This article analyzes some factors underlying the spread of insurgent violence in Africa. It focuses on the impact external factors have on power struggles on the continent. The first of these is the unsteady support for democracy from Western donors, which has impeded more far-reaching domestic changes in much of Africa. Second are wider changes in the international setting that dramatically enhanced the international standing of armed movements in the post-1989 period. The article argues that the interplay of both factors has induced would-be leaders to conquer state power by violent rather than non-violent means. This becomes particularly evident in regard to Western efforts to solve violent conflict through power-sharing agreements. The hypothesis is put forward that the institutionalization of this practice for the sake of ‘peace’, i.e. providing rebels with a share of state power, has important demonstration effects across the continent. It creates an incentive structure would-be leaders can seize upon by embarking on the insurgent path as well. As a result, and irrespective of their effectiveness in any given case, power-sharing agreements may contribute to the reproduction of insurgent violence.


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