African Affairs Advance Access originally published online on December 5, 2005
African Affairs 2006 105(418):1-25; doi:10.1093/afraf/adi090
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Can policy intervention beat the resource curse? Evidence from the ChadCameroon pipeline project
Scott Pegg (smpegg{at}iupui.edu) is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Indiana University/Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN, USA.
Countries that are heavily dependent on natural resource exports have performed poorly on various measures of economic, social, and political development a phenomenon usually described as the resource curse. In spite of this, many Western policymakers believe that natural resources will ultimately provide Africas road to development. The World Bank argues that the resource curse is not inevitable and that good governance and sound economic policies are intervening variables that can mitigate its ill effects. This article critically evaluates the ChadCameroon pipeline project in order to assess whether or not policy interventions can ameliorate the resource curse. The largest single private sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa, the ChadCameroon pipeline project has also featured unprecedented World Bank policy interventions designed to address the complex environmental, social, and budgetary implications of large-scale oil production. The pipeline project is the World Banks most significant attempt yet to modify the intervening variable of government policy and transform the equation from one of resource extraction + bad governance
poverty exacerbation to one of resource extraction + good governance
poverty reduction. This article finds that these policy interventions are not working well and that the ChadCameroon pipeline project is unlikely to lead to poverty alleviation.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 46th annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, March 2005.
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11. Sachs and Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, pp. 8 and 15.
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31. IBRD and IDA, Management Report and Recommendation, p. 3; The World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC), Chad/Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project. Fourth Semi-Annual Report to the Executive Directors (January-June 2002). Document SecM2002-0402 (The World Bank and IFC, Washington, DC, 2002), p. 1.
32. Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Chad and Cameroon (Energy Information Administration, Washington, DC, 2004); Association Tchadienne pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de lHomme (Chad), Centre pour lEnvironnement et le Développement (Cameroon) and Environmental Defense (USA), The Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project: A call for accountability (Environmental Defense, Washington, DC, 2002), preface.
33. Jane L. Guyer, Briefing: the Chad-Cameroon petroleum and pipeline development project, African Affairs 101, 402 (2002), p. 112.
34. Association Tchadienne pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de lHomme et al., The Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project, p. 5.
35. Donald R. Norland, Innovations of the Chad/Cameroon pipeline project: thinking outside the box, Mediterranean Quarterly 14, 2 (2003), p. 47.
36. Esso Chad, Chad/Cameroon development project. Project Update No. 18, Mid-Year 2005 (Esso Chad, Ndjamena, 2005), p. 8; Esso Chad, Chad/Cameroon Development Project 3rd Quarter 2004. Report 16 (Esso Chad, Ndjamena, 2004), pp. 7 and 52; Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief; Chad: testing times for Cameroon pipeline project, Oxford Analytica, 26 January 2005.
37. Esso Chad, Chad/Cameroon Development Project 3rd Quarter 2003. Report 12 (Esso Chad, Ndjamena, Chad, 2003), p. 7. Other dates taken from the construction component of the http://www.essochad.com Website. The World Banks original timeline for the project can be found in The World Bank and IFC, Project Appraisal Document on Proposed International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Loans in Amounts of US$ 39.5 Million to the Republic of Chad and US$ 53.4 Million to the Republic of Cameroon and on Proposed International Finance Corporation Loans in Amount of US$ 100 Million in A-Loans and up to US$ 300 Million in B-Loans to the Tchad Oil Transportation Company, S.A. and Cameroon Oil Transportation Company, S.A. for a Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project 2000. Report No. 19343 (The World Bank and IFC, Washington, DC, 2000), p. 55.
38. World Bank and IFC, Fourth Semi-Annual Report, p. 1. See also World Bank and IFC, Project Appraisal Document, pp. 238.
39. Esso Chad, Chad/Cameroon Development Project 3rd Quarter 2004, p. 53.
40. International Advisory Group, Report of Mission 8 to Chad October 10-26, 2004 (International Advisory Group, Montreal, 2004), pp. 146; Esso Chad, Chad/Cameroon Development Project 3rd Quarter 2004, p. 53; Chad: testing times for Cameroon pipeline project, Oxford Analytica, 26 January 2005.
41. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Economic Outlook (IMF, Washington, DC, 2004), pp. 42 and 53; Chad: testing times for Cameroon pipeline project, Oxford Analytica, 26 January 2005.
42. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Chad: 2003 Article IV Consultation; and Ex Post Assessment of Performance Under ESAF/PRFG Programs. IMF Country Report No. 04/111 (IMF, Washington, DC, 2004), p. 16.
43. The Inspection Panel, Investigation Report: Chad-Cameroon petroleum and pipeline project (Loan No. 4558-CD); Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project (Credit No. 3373-CD); and Management of the Petroleum Economy (Credit No. 3316-CD) (The Inspection Panel of the World Bank Group, Washington, DC, 2002); The Inspection Panel, Investigation Report: Cameroon: Petroleum development and pipeline project (Loan No. 7020-CM) and Petroleum Environment Capacity Enhancement (CAPECE) Project (Credit No. 3372-CM). Report No. 25734 (The Inspection Panel of the World Bank Group, Washington, DC, 2003).
44. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/fin_dis.htm.
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50. This discussion draws from Gary and Karl, Bottom of the Barrel, pp. 6970, and Environmental Defense, Catholic Relief Services and Bank Information Center, The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline: The case for the implementation of the EIR recommendations (Environmental Defense, Catholic Relief Services and Bank Information Center, Washington, DC, 2004).
51. Gary and Karl, Bottom of the Barrel, p. 69.
52. IMF, Chad: 2003 Article IV Consultation, pp. 145.
53. Gary and Karl, Bottom of the Barrel, p. 70.
54. The Inspection Panel, Investigation Report: Chad-Cameroon petroleum and pipeline project, pp. xx and 8990.
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56. The Inspection Panel, Investigation Report: Chad-Cameroon petroleum and pipeline project, p. 84.
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58. International Advisory Group, Report of Mission 8, p. 1; Chad: testing times for Cameroon pipeline project, Oxford Analytica, 26 January 2005.
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62. International Advisory Group, Report of Mission 8, pp. ii and 11.
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65. The Inspection Panel, Investigation Report: Chad-Cameroon petroleum and pipeline project, pp. xx and 134.
66. External Compliance Monitoring Group, Report of the External Compliance Monitoring Group First Site Visit to Chad and Cameroon, February 23 March 3, 2001 (Dappolonia, Genoa, 2001), pp. 9, 13, 15, 16, and 22.
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69. International Advisory Group, Report of Mission 8, p.18; External Compliance Monitoring Group, Report of Tenth Site Visit, p. 47.
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81. Frynas, Corporate and state responses to anti-oil protests in the Niger Delta, pp. 32 and 38.
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105. Gary and Karl, Bottom of the Barrel, p. 76.
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113. Birdsall and Subramanian, Saving Iraq from its oil, p. 86.
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