African Affairs Advance Access originally published online on November 9, 2006
African Affairs 2007 106(422):95-111; doi:10.1093/afraf/adl038
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Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards? The politics of local government reform in Sierra Leone
Paul Jackson (p.b.jackson{at}bham.ac.uk) is Director of the Department of International Development, University of Birmingham, and Director of the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform.
This article examines the relationship between chiefdom authority and decentralization in post-war Sierra Leone. The chieftaincy has been in crisis for some time and is widely thought to be responsible for contributing to rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) recruitment. However, chiefs remain an important influence in Sierra Leone, and there is little demand for an end to the chieftaincy system. Rather than an abolition of chieftaincy, governance at local level requires constructive relationships between chiefdoms and local governments and not simply a reshuffling of agrarian class relationships or old ways of doing politics. This in turn requires a reform of the chieftaincy system and the resolution of local political tensions arising from decentralization.
This work is based on extensive work in Sierra Leone at local government level in 2003, 2004, and 2005 for DFID and the World Bank where he worked as part of the reform process across the country and at different levels of government.
1. R. Fanthorpe, ‘Neither citizen nor subject? ‘‘Lumpen’’ agency and the legacy of native administration in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 100 (2001), pp. 363–86. In most rural areas, the chieftaincy is also closely related to secret societies, an impenetrable but critical element of rural social structure that ensures a broad power base for each chief, reinforcing a predominantly male gerontocracy.
2. See P. Richards, The Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sierra Leone, Working Paper 21 (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Conflict Research Unit, 2004); P. Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians: rebuilding local government in Sierra Leone’, Public Administration and Development, 25 (2005), pp. 49–58; J. Hanlon, Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Pre-Conditions for War in Sierra Leone? (Research paper 2005/50, World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations Univ., Tokyo, 2005); R. Fanthorpe, A. Jay and V. Kamara, A Review of the Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme, Incorporating An Analysis of Chiefdom Administration in Sierra Leone (Department for International Development DFID, London, 2002).
3. There are several different levels of ‘chief’, but the level that has power in Sierra Leone is designated as ‘paramount chief’. Within the text, the word ‘chief’ refers to ‘paramount chiefs’.
4. Around 44 percent of current chiefs were elected after 2002. See P. Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest (James Currey, Oxford, 1998) and P. Richards, K. Bah and J. Vincent, The Social Assessment Study: Community-driven development and social capital in post-war Sierra Leone (Community Driven Development Group, World Bank and National Commission for Social Action of the Government of Sierra Leone, Freetown, 2003).
5. This is very clear from the large-scale consultations carried out by DFID and also the UNDP and was reflected in fieldwork in Sierra Leone.
6. Of course, there are also several excluded groups outside local government itself, including donors and NGOs.
7. Paul Richards, ‘To fight or to farm? Agrarian dimensions of the Mano River conflicts (Liberia and Sierra Leone)’, African Affairs, 104, 417 (2005), pp. 571–90, and Richard Fanthorpe, ‘On the limits of liberal peace: chiefs and democratic decentralization in post-war Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 105, 418 (2006), pp. 27–49.
8. Richards, ‘To fight or to farm’.
10. See also Hanlon, Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Pre-Conditions for War in Sierra Leone? and Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’.
11. This was also a driver of the decentralization strategy itself along with the sensitization and training efforts carried out by the DFID/World Bank teams under the auspices of the Decentralization Secretariat.
12. As an example, a class A chiefdom like Gbonkolenken has 2 chiefs, 3 administrative staff, 14 local court staff, 12 chiefdom police, and 3 health workers.
13. See A. Jay and M.T. Koroma, From ‘Crying’ and Clientelism to Rights and Responsibilities, Study for the Government of Sierra Leone/EC on Accountability in Sierra Leone, (Freetown, 2004).
14. See, for example, Jay and Koroma, From ‘Crying’ and Clientelism, Fanthorpe, ‘Neither citizen nor subject’, and Richards et al. ‘The social assessment study’.
15. Until recently, the rate was fixed at 500 leones per head (about 10 pence), but now, councils set the rates and can, theoretically, set it at zero.
16. The district officer role dates from colonial times where he was the representative of the Central government at the local level, with the relevant powers and responsibilities. Effectively, this role is one of representation and oversight and is the central government’s main political controlling mechanism over rural areas.
17. Discussions with the DFID diamond adviser were inconclusive as to actual amounts that were paid to the chiefs, and as a recent (2005) unpublished functional review of the Ministry of Mines pointed out, the ministry was incapable of providing accurate figures.
18. R. Fanthorpe, Tax Administration and Representative Authority in Sierra Leone, DFID, June 2004. See also R. Fanthorpe, A. Jay and V. Kamara, A Review of the Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme (DFID, London, 2002).
19. S. Archibald and P. Richards, ‘Seeds and rights: new approaches to post-war agriculture rehabilitation in Sierra Leone’, Disasters 26, 4 (2004), pp. 356–67. This is also reflected in earlier DFID studies. A recent World Bank program concentrates resources in VDCs, but the bank holds that the Local Government Act 2004 changes this relationship since approval has to be given by the council.
20. Chiefs are elected for life, but the hereditary line is complicated by chiefs coming from more than one family in any one chiefdom. Once a chief dies, therefore, there is frequently competition between the different families eligible to provide chiefs.
21. See Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’.
22. DFID, Identifying Options for Improving chiefdom and Community Governance in Sierra Leone (DFID, Sierra Leone, October 2004).
23. World Bank, Sierra Leone: Strategic options for public sector reform (Report no. 25110, Washington, DC, 2003). See also DFID, Identifying Options.
24. C. Fithin and P. Richards, ‘Making war, crafting peace’, Richards, P. (ed.), No Peace, No War: An anthropology of contemporary armed conflicts (James Currey, Oxford, 2004), pp. 117–36.
25. Fithin and Richards, ‘Making war’. See also A. Sawyer, ‘Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: the case of the Mano River Basin area’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 42, 3 (2004), pp. 37–63.
26. See, for example, World Bank, Sierra Leone — Strategic options for public sector reform.
27. This type of discussion is virtually impossible to corroborate accurately, but certainly one interpretation of the later changes to the new Local Government Act in retaining central powers could be that the Ministry of Local Government wanted to say that it was decentralizing without actually going very far down the road of divesting powers, which would not be an uncommon reaction from a central ministry.
28. See Hanlon, International Community. Whilst I have some sympathy with this view, it is somewhat harsh on the decisions open to DFID at the time where virtually the whole of society had broken down. What is more difficult, however, is why DFID persisted with a programme that was clearly not working (and was criticized by DFID staff), was open to corruption and was clearly shown to be unpopular by DFID’s own consultations at local level.
29. These have headquarters in Bo, Makeni, and Kenema, respectively.
30. This was reported by several donor officials and was a cause of heated discussion during the process between the ministry officials and international and local officials involved in the process.
31. DFID, Identifying Options.
32. Even to the point where the krios as non-indigenous Sierra Leoneans imported Freemasonry as their own secret society to counteract the rural societies such as poro. See S. Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The destruction of Liberia and the religious dimension of an African civil war (New York University Press, New York, 1999) for an excellent survey of Liberian secret societies. For a historical view of Sierra Leonean secret societies, see F.W.H. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, London, 1926).
33. Jay and Momoh, ‘From crying and clientelism’.
34. Note that there are some female paramount chiefs, but political matters are more likely to be resolved in male secret societies; thus, the chief has to resort to proxies and emissaries.
35. Richards, Political Economy.
36. There were extensive consultations at village level carried out as part of DFID’s chiefdom Governance Reform Project in 2000/2001 that provided perspectives on why the RUF fighters destroyed the court barris, why paramount chiefs were targeted, and why rural youth took up arms to destroy their own communities.
37. See Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’ for further notes on the sensitization process and issues affecting the establishment of local government.
38. The story of the LGSC is an article in itself. Suffice to say that, although partially established, it has received very little support from the central government and is not in any position to make any real recommendations to local government on recruitment.
39. The figure of three transfers was discussed in a meeting with the Establishments Secretary in early 2005 in Freetown.
40. This was confirmed recently by a functional review of the Ministry of Mines that concluded that the situation had become so confused that what was required was a completely ‘fresh start’ in terms of redrafting all of the current legislation and regulatory guidelines. ‘Review of Ministry of Mineral Resources’ (Unpublished DFID review, Freetown, 2005).
41. And is probably the result of a relatively weak senstitization campaign by the Ministry of Local Government.
42. One chairperson told me that he had sacked his Chief administrator because he had been conspiring with the local paramount chief against the council. This is not surprising given the history of district officers, chiefs and taxes.
43. This certainly happened, but the exact reasons given for the LCCA’s demise are different according to the chairperson. In another often-cited case, the chairperson printed his own local tax tickets and collected the revenue himself.
44. See J. Cutting, ‘Overview of the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development capacity needs in relation to the decentralization and local government reform programme (Government of Sierra Leone)’, DFID, Sierra Leone, May 2004.
45. DFID, Identifying Options.
46. Speech by His Excellency the President at the ceremony for the recognition of newly-elected paramount chiefs and the establishment of a council of chiefs at Kenema, Bo, Makeni and Port Loko, 26–30 January 2003.
47. Certainly, DFID staff believed that this would lead to more widespread support for modernization.
48. DFID, Identifying Options.
49. The original DFID consultation documents show this clearly. See DFID ‘Summary of Reports on Consultation Workshops’ (Chiefdom Government Reform Programme, Freetown, December 2001).
50. This is an issue that is frequently brought up in several analyses of chiefs, including DFID, Identifying Options, Fanthorpe, Jay and Kamara, ‘A Review of the Chiefdom Governance Reform Programme’, and Jay and Momoh, ‘From crying and clientalism’.
51. Jackson, ‘Chiefs, money and politicians’.
52. Ibid; Hanlon, International community.
53. For example, the Chairman of the Local Government Service Commission.
54. The author discussed this with the Establishments Secretary in person, who was assuming that this would be the case anyway.
55. Fanthorpe, ‘On the limits of liberal peace’, p. 47.
56. One of my colleagues in Sierra Leone refers to the position of councillors as the ‘Animal Farm Option’, where councillors just act as a new part of the elite.