African Affairs Advance Access originally published online on April 3, 2006
African Affairs 2006 105(419):173-199; doi:10.1093/afraf/adi122
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Discomfiture of democracy? The 2005 election crisis in Ethiopia and its aftermath
J. Abbink is affiliated to the African Studies Centre, Leiden, and Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.
In this article, I assess the nature and the impact of the May 2005 Ethiopian parliamentary elections on Ethiopian politics. The elections, although controversial and flawed, showed significant gains for the opposition but led to a crisis of the entire democratization process. I revisit Ethiopian political culture in the light of neo-patrimonial theory and ask why the political system has stagnated and slid back into authoritarianism. Most analyses of post-1991 Ethiopian politics discuss the formal aspects of the political system but do not deal sufficiently with power politics in a historical perspective. There is a continued need to reconceptualize the analysis of politics in Ethiopia, and Africa in general, in more cultural and historical terms, away from the formal political science approaches that have predominated. The success of transitional democracy is also dependent on a countervailing middle class, which is suppressed in Ethiopia. Also, political–judicial institutions are still precarious, and their operation is dependent on the current political elite and caught in the politics of the dominant (ruling) party. All these refer back to the historically engrained authoritarian/hierarchical tradition in Ethiopian politics. On the basis of the electoral process, the post-election manoeuvring, the role of opposition forces, and the violent crisis in late 2005, I address the Ethiopian political process in the light of governance traditions and of resurrected neo-patrimonial rule that, in effect, tend to block further democratization.
1. G. Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, civil society and the transition process (Macmillan Press, London, 2000).
2. R.H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983); R.H. Bates (ed.), Towards a Political Economy of Development: A rational choice perspective (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1998).
3. J.-F. Médard (ed.), ‘L’État néo-patrimonial en Afrique noire’, in États d’afrique Noire: Formations, mécanismes et crise (Karthala, Paris, 1991), pp. 323–53. J.-F. Médard, ‘Patrimonialism, neo-patrimonialism and the study of the post-colonial state in Subsaharan Africa’, in H.S. Marcussen (ed.), Improved Natural Resource Management: – the role of formal organisations and informal networks and institutions (Roskilde University, Institute of International Development Studies, Roskilde, 1996), pp. 76–97. M. Bratton and N. Van de Walle, Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa, World Politics 46, 4 (1994), pp. 453–89.
4. G. Hyden and M. Bratton, Governance and Politics in Africa (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1991); M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997).
5. P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as political instrument (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, and James Currey, Oxford, 1999); J. Milliken (ed.), ‘State failure, collapse and reconstruction’, Development and Change 33, 5 (2002), [Special issue].
6. For example, D.L. Donham, Marxist Modern: An ethnographic history of the Ethiopian revolution (University of California Press, Berkeley, and James Currey, Oxford, 1999); M. Karlström, ‘Imagining democracy: political culture and democratization in Buganda’, Africa 66, 4 (1996), pp. 485–505; M. Okema, Political Culture in Tanzania (Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, 1996).
7. K.F. Hansen, ‘The politics of personal relations: beyond neopatrimonial practices in northern Cameroon’, Africa 73, 2 (2003), pp. 202–25; G. Erdmann and U. Engel, ‘Neopatrimonialism reconsidered — critical review and elaboration of an elusive concept’, paper presented at the 45th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Washington, DC, 4–8 December 2002.
8. Gill, Dynamics of Democratization.
9. See R. Crilly, ‘Feeling is not good after Ethiopia vote’, USA Today, 2 July 2005 <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-07-20-ethiopia_x.htm> (20 October 2005).
10. T.S. Lyons, ‘Closing the transition: the May 1995 elections in Ethiopia’, Journal of Modern African Studies 34, 1 (1996), pp. 121–42.
11. A.M. Abdullahi, ‘Article 39 of the Ethiopian constitution on secession and self-determination: a panacea to the nationality question in Africa?’, Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 31, 4 (1998), pp. 440–55; Kidane Mengisteab, ‘Ethiopia’s ethnic-based federalism: 10 years after’, African Issues 19, 1–2 (2002), pp. 20–6.
12. S.F. Joireman, ‘Opposition politics and ethnicity in Ethiopia: "we will all go down together" ’, Journal of Modern African Studies 35, 3 (1997), pp. 387–407; Medhane Tadesse and J. Young, ‘TPLF: reform or decline?’, Review of African Political Economy 30, 97 (2003), pp. 389–403.
13. After May 1991, the EPRDF quickly moved to take over key sectors of the Ethiopian economy. This was a quite successful operation. Large business conglomerates are now headed by prominent party members or their associates/relatives. A first — anonymous — report that inventoried the take-over in detail was ‘Ethiopian Non-Governmental Businesses, A Preliminary Survey’ (Addis Ababa, 1996, unpublished, 56 pp.). The new patronage networks draw heavy criticism from the disadvantaged non-party-affiliated business people.
14. A recent study by two Ethiopian researchers has underlined that Ethiopia is a significantly ‘conflict-prone’ country, where ‘... new regimes have failed to learn the lessons of their predecessors’: Alemayehu Geda and Befekadu Degefe,‘Conflict, post-conflict and economic performance in Ethiopia’, in A.K. Fosu and P. Collier (eds), Post-Conflict Economies in Africa (Palgrave-Macmillan, New York, 2005), p. 138.
15. For a basic statement of this, see ‘Our revolutionary goals and the next steps’, Amharic document for TPLF members, June 1993 [translated version in Ethiopian Register 3, 6 (1993), pp. 20–9].
16. Gill, Dynamics of Democratization.
17. United Nations Family Planning Association press release, 13 October 2005. The current annual growth rate of at least 2.4 percent is high and undermines environmental recovery, economic growth, and the realization of the Millennium Development Goals.
18. Médard, ‘Patrimonialism, neo-patrimonialism’, p. 87.
19. This agenda is contained, for instance, in Abyotawi Demokrasi (‘Revolutionary Democracy’), an about 700-page internal EPRDF ideological document, Addis Ababa 2001.
20. See Yitzhak Kiflegzie, ‘Bereket’s harassment as "political" debate’, The Reporter (Addis Ababa), 19 March 2005.
21. See reports in the local Ethiopian press: Dagim-Wonch’if, 29 March 2005; T’obbia, 14 April 2005; T’omar, 13 April 2005; Reporter, 17 April 2005; Seife-Näbälbal, 21 April 2005. Sea also the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, 80th Special Report, 19 October 2004.
22. Some observers were quick to label the CUD as ‘Amhara chauvinists’, an incorrect and rather mischievous qualification, reflecting the wish to ethnicize Ethiopian politics. No doubt some entered the CUD as representatives of the Amhara/Amharic-speaking people, but the party’s political agenda was national, not ethnic.
23. See, for instance, a report of PINR (an independent US-based research institution), ‘Intelligence Brief: Ethiopia’, PINR, 25 October 2005 <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=387&language_id=1>.
24. See ‘Ethiopia — Zenawi accuses opposition of agitating for poll violence’, AFP, 6 May 2005 [Also in the Sudan Tribune: <http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=9432> (23 October 2005)].
25. A reference called ‘ridiculous’ in the article ‘Ethiopia: a taste of democracy’, The Economist, 19 May 2005 <http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3996217> (15 October 2005).
26. There were parallel elections for the regional houses of parliament. For results, see the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia website <http://www.electionsethiopia.org/PDF/results/Regional%20Council%20Summary.pdf> (23 September 2005). In these regional elections, the dominant party EPRDF also carried most of the seats. In Tigray, the seats were all for the TPLF. In the Addis Ababa region, the opposition party ‘Qinijit’ (CUD) won all 138 seats except one. Because of the unresolved post-election crisis, the CUD has not yet taken over the city’s administration as of January 2006. They are now prevented from doing so, because in the November 2005 crisis the entire leadership was thrown in jail. It is possible that the government will, by procedural changes and stalling, block the CUD take-over of the capital’s administration.
27. S. Pausewang, K. Tronvoll, and L. Aalen (eds), Ethiopia since the Derg: A decade of democratic pretension and performance (Zed Press, London, 2002).
28. See the Ethiopian weekly The Reporter, 18 May 2005.
29. See National Electoral Board of Ethiopia website <http://www.electionsethiopia.org/Index.html> (23 September 2005). The final results were released some 3 and a half months after the election date (5 September 2005).
30. Quite a number of the constituencies disputed by the CUD (the large majority of them) seemed to have been contested on less than convincing grounds. EPRDF disputed 70 of the 299 seats.
31. During one interview with the BBC’s Steven Sackur, in the programme ‘Hard Talk’, 4 July 2005 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/hardtalk/4649373.stm>, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had said, in response to a question on how long he would serve: ‘That’s up to my party to decide’ and ‘... people have to stay as long as the people want them to stay, and do so through freely-contested elections. The decision has to be that of the people in the final analysis’.
32. It also changed rules for city revenue collection (e.g. from public transport) and budget support for the Addis Ababa region, to be governed by the opposition CUD (Oxford Analytica report, ‘Ethiopia: boycott, protest threats heighten insecurity’, 23 September 2005). This hampers the economic possibilities of the new administration — if it ever materializes — and will in due course have residents shift the blame to the new city government.
33. See ‘Thousands arrested across Ethiopia in post-election crackdown’, Washington Post, 16 June 2005 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/15/AR2005061502416.html> ( 24 July 2005).
34. This was Tesfaye Adane Gara in Arsi Neghele. His case is described in a documentary Australian radio (‘Date line’) <http://news.sbs.com.au/dateline/index.php?page=transcript&dte=2005-08-24&headlineid=1013> (25 October 2005).
35. A first detailed report on the disturbances was Statement no. 84 (15 July 2005) of the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (Addis Ababa).
36. The language predominantly spoken in the capital.
37. See ‘Ethiopia arrests 43 opposition members before rally’, Reuters, 26 September 2005 <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26392186.htm> (23 October 2005).
38. The other large powers in the world community — China and Russia — and Arab countries in the wider region kept quiet, in conformity with their lack of interest in the furthering of democratic ideals and rule of law in the northeast African sub-region.
39. See AU Press release 45/2005 (of 10 August 2005), ‘Statement of the African Union on the Ethiopian Legislative Elections held on Sunday’, 15 May 2005 <http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm>.
40. This report (of 25 August 2005) is available at the website <http://www.et-eueom.org> (20 October 2005).
41. State Department press statement, 1 September 2005. Also their press statement of 16 September 2005 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53355.htm>. It said: ‘Because reported election irregularities raised concerns about transparency, we will work with the international community and the Ethiopian government and parties to strengthen the electoral process’. But no results were achieved on this score.
42. These were the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), allegedly ‘operating illegally in the country’.
43. See <http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2199.pdf>.
44. Both instituted ad hoc by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia.
45. See also the interview with Clarke in the Ethiopian weekly Capital, 15 November 2005, expressing his dismay at the violent turn of events.
46. Posted on many websites, among them: <http://www.ethiopiafirst.com/news2005/Jan/Congress-Letter-June20.pdf>. Although their concern was justified, this letter suffered from some exaggeration and inaccuracies.
47. IRIN interview with Ishac Diwan, 18 November 2005 <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=50171&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa> (21 November 2005).
48. However, Ethiopia’s recent economic policies have not all been a dismal failure; there were many new initiatives and significant GDP growth. See for an interesting opinion piece: ‘Our material poverty has little to do with the resistance against Meles & Co.’, by Bezuayehu Kegerji (pseudonym), on a critical Ethiopian diaspora website <http://www.ethiomedia.com/fastpress/message_to_our_donors.html> (15 November 2005).
49. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s interview of 25 September 2005 was marked by quite bellicose language <http://www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2005/Sep/25Sep05/Sep25e2.htm> (24 October 2005).
50. See ‘Ethiopia: opposition party calls for consumer boycott’, IRIN (UN) <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=49872&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&SelectCountry=ETHIOPIA> (1 November 2005).
51. This had also happened with the first pan-ethnic opposition movement, National Democratic Union (NDU) in 1993–94, which only survived for a few years before withering away.
52. Despite a large majority of ONC MPs still supporting Dr Merera. See ‘A shake-up of the ONC’, The Reporter <http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1113>. Cf. for the political background, the interview of ONC chairman Merera Gudina with The Reporter <http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1132> (26 November 2005). The UEDF also had internal problems because of the great role diaspora groups played in this party. For example, on 24 October 2005, the two UEDF leaders were ‘dismissed’ by the (diaspora-dominated) executive committee of their party because of the committee’s rejection of the decision to take up their seats in the new, contested, Ethiopian parliament. To dismiss these two prestigious and at that point indispensable leaders was a sign of immaturity.
53. See Human Rights Watch statement, ‘Ethiopia: hidden crackdown in rural areas’, 13 January 2006.
54. See ‘Democratic dawn in Ethiopia fades as abuses come to light’, The Observer, 4 December 2005. Cf. also the documentary on Britain’s Channel 4 of November 2005 <http://www.channel4.com/player/playerwindow.html?id=1310&vert=news> (28 December 2005). Information from two former prisoners (Addis Ababa, 30 January 2006) from Didessa revealed that many prisoners had died because of disease and snakebites, whereas others were killed by hyenas and lions after escaping.
55. See ‘Ethiopia charges opposition members with genocide’, Reuters, 21 December 2005 <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L2111222.htm> (25 December 2005).
56. One journalist said: ‘We feel betrayed by democracy (...). It is as if the government encouraged us to speak our minds so that it would know who to grab when the time came’. Cited in M. Odenheimer, ‘A dream defiled — the betrayal of Ethiopia’s democracy’, Washington Post, 17 December 2005.
57. Police responded by beating and arresting the pupils and issuing warnings against teachers and parents.
58. Also victimizing elderly women, mothers, and children. The government, however, announced an ‘independent inquiry’ on the violence [see ‘Resolve to set up Independent Inquiry Commission part of efforts to ensure the rule of law – Ministry’, Ethiopian Herald, 19 November 2005 <http://allafrica.com/stories/200511210142.html>]. Previous inquiry commissions on violent incidents rarely led to prosecution or conviction of any security force members or government officials.
59. See the message ‘Kä 2000 bälay yäQinijjit Dägafiwoch Täsaddädu’ (‘More than 2,000 CUD supporters were made refugees’) <http://www.mahder.com/index.php?name=amharic> (21 October 2005) in Amharic.
60. The same mechanism was seen in earlier confrontations of government loyalist-activists with Oromo people claiming rights and usually declared to be ‘OLF (the banned Oromo Liberation Front) supporters’.
61. News item on the website <http://ethiopianreview.homestead.com> (28 November 2005). It could not immediately be checked against other sources.
62. In 2001, the Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi stated in an ideological discussion piece for his party (‘Basic questions of democracy in Ethiopia’) that ‘liberal democracy’ is not possible in Ethiopia. See The Reporter (Amharic magazine) 4, 36 (May 2001). Later in 2001, an ideological document in Amharic was produced, called ‘Revolutionary Democracy’ (cf. note 6), outlining the ruling party’s future strategy. Western embassies had (parts of) it translated, but how it changed their view on Ethiopian politics as a result of reading it is not clear.
63. N. Van de Walle, ‘Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa’s emerging party systems’, Journal of Modern African Studies 42, 2 (2003), p. 315.
64. See the interesting analysis by Paulos Milkias, ‘The great purge and ideological paradox in contemporary Ethiopian politics’, Horn of Africa 19, 1–4 (2001), pp. 1–99.
65. O. Therkildsen, ‘Understanding public management through neo-patrimonialism: a paradigm for all African seasons?’, in U. Engel and G.R. Olsen (eds), The African Exception (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005), pp. 49–50.
66. Most members of which indeed resisted the party loyalist principles and crony appointments that the leading party tried to introduce after 1991.
67. Hansen, ‘The politics of personal relations’, p. 222.
68. Cf. J. Abbink, ‘Transformations of violence in twentieth-century Ethiopia: cultural roots, political conjunctures’, Focaal. Tijdschrift voor Antropologie 25, (1995), pp. 57–77.
69. By January 2006, all independent newspapers had stopped appearing.