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African Affairs Advance Access published online on September 2, 2006
African Affairs, doi:10.1093/afraf/adl024
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© The Author [2006]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved

Article

Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe

Michael Bratton 1 * and Eldred Masunungure 2

1 Department of Political Science and African Studies, Michigan State University, and Executive Director, Afrobarometer
2 Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe, and Director of the Mass Public Opinion Institute, Harare

* To whom correspondence should be addressed.
Michael Bratton, E-mail: mbratton{at}msu.edu


  Abstract

In May 2005, the government of Zimbabwe launched Operation Murambatsvina (OM), a state-sponsored campaign to stifle independent economic and political activity in the country’s urban areas. This article employs a national probability sample survey to analyse the popular reactions of ordinary Zimbabweans to this landmark event. It shows that the application of state repression succeeds at some goals, fails at others, and has powerful unintended effects. We report that the scope of OM was wide and that the main victims of OM were younger, unemployed families whom state security agents saw as potential recruits for social unrest. Whereas OM undoubtedly disrupted the informal economy, we show that it did not succeed in banishing urban dwellers to rural areas or permanently shutting down illicit trade. Moreover, the crackdown thoroughly discredited the police and other state institutions. We also demonstrate that state repression emboldened its victims, deepening polarisation between political parties and fortifying the ranks of Zimbabwe’s opposition movement.


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